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ABSTRACT
There are many areas in which naval vessels could improve
safety standards, although naval vessels are not necessarily
regarded as less secure than the civil vessels. Although the
navies never have considered water on deck a problem, it
seems that this problem has a critical value in the ship damage
stability analysis. As an example, this damage should be investigated if the ship has a low freeboard.
For this research various studies and calculations have been
carried out on several designed test vessels. It is possible to
decide which criteria to use in terms of damages for each type
of vessel, for example a landing ship faces more risk having
grounding or raking on its bottom. This technical paper concludes with a method that helps and supports the naval architect in the analysis of damage stability. In this way, the naval
engineer is able to determine which of the existing criteria fits
best with the requirements of the ships function by following
these few principles.

I. INTRODUCTION
To avoid duplication, gaps and shortcomings in safety, it is
important for the navies to work together with the Classification Societies in the development of effective and sustainable
arrangements. Thus, development of rules for warships Naval
Ships Rules by various Classification Societies is the most
important contribution to work in this area. The idea of cooperation to make an International Convention for the Safety Of
Life At Sea (SOLAS) goes back to the nineties of the last
century. Remember that the philosophy of the SOLAS is
applicable to merchant ships, and is not fully transferable to
warships. In September 1998, Classification Societies of the
Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) met to establish links within their own organization.
This meeting established the Naval Ship Classification Association (NSCA), in May 2002, and the cooperation was dePaper submitted 08/14/12; revised 05/27/13; accepted 07/19/13. Author for
correspondence: Rodrigo Pérez Fernández (e-mail: rodriperfer@hotmail.com).
PhD Naval Engineer. Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Navales
(Universidad Politécnica de Madrid), Spain.

fined according to the following terms of reference: promote
safety standards at sea, promote measures to protect the marine environment, promote and develop common operating
standards, undertake R&D to support the above and communicate the views of the partnership agreements and the NSCA.

II. A BIG DEBATE: DETERMINISTIC OR
PROBABILISTIC CRITERIA
At this moment, the community of Naval Architects is debating between the probabilistic and the deterministic methods.
It is therefore necessary to define in this technical paper what
a deterministic or a probabilistic method is. To verify the
validity of a model it is necessary to deduct from it a certain
number of hypothesis and then to corroborate it with observations of predicted results.
Deterministic models correspond to mathematical models
designed on the assumption that the result of an experiment is
determined by the conditions under which it is performed;
stochastic models (probabilistic) are those for which the data
is obtained through a sampling of probability distributions.
This sample allows that uncertainty (which can be reduced if
more data is collected) and variability are propagated from the
model and demonstrated in the results of the model.
Are probabilistic and deterministic approaches comparable?
 From a mathematical point of view: in general no.
 From a theoretical point of view: limited way.
 From a practical point of view (analysis of real ships…):
yes.
In Table 1 and Table 2 it is possible to visualize the probabilistic and deterministic approaches, plus the damage criteria applicability.
Are different probabilistic approaches comparable?
 From a mathematical point of view: yes.
 From a theoretical point of view: yes.
 From a practical point of view (analysis of real ships…):
yes.
Not all the civil ships must follow the probabilistic criteria.
There are several groups of ships that do not follow the new
criteria and still using deterministic criteria:
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Table 1. Probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches.
Approach
Damage Size
Number of damaged spaces
Damage Cases

Probabilistic
Deterministic
Variable
Fixed
No pre determinate
Fixed
Several/Free
Few/Fixed

Table 3. Use cases about required subdivision index.
Case

Carriers
(new vs. old rules)

Length

> in new ones

Number of people

N/A

Passenger
(new rules vs. A.265)
> in new ones except very
high L
> in new ones except very
high N

Table 2. Damage criteria applicability.
Ships

Carriers
Passenger
Probabilistic
Deterministic (SOLAS 90)
Before 2009
(Old SOLAS)
Probabilistic (A.265)
After 2009 Probabilistic (new rules) Probabilistic (new rules)
Size
L  80 (m)
All






Tankers, chemical ships.
Ships with a reduced freeboard.
Special craft and offshore ships.
High speed crafts.

In summary, it could be said that a deterministic model
assumes that the actual result is determined by the conditions
under which the experiment takes place, however when a stochastic model is used, the experimental conditions determine
only probabilistic behavior (the probability distribution) of
the observable results. The criteria of US Navy and British
Royal Navy are based on deterministic models, so it is necessary to remember the importance of these models. Given the
relevancy of probabilistic methods, they have been evaluated;
in particular we have studied the philosophy and new tools for
its calculation.
It is equally important to point out the pros and cons of
using probabilistic criteria. These probabilistic criteria are
aiming to provide estimates of uncertainty and variability
associated with each of the predicted levels of risk. This is
one of the positive aspects (stochastic) of such configuration
models, but also leads to confusion in the interpretation of the
data. Furthermore, those same estimations are uncertain and
depend on the methods and assumptions used to make these
calculations. This fact is frequently overvalued due to the
limited data set available, and perhaps overestimating risk
associated with a particular fault.
An assessment procedure would be considered a more effective method for implementing the proposal of survival of an
optimized schema of design of vessels. The assessment procedure is an approach that bases the probability of survival on
the basis of survival in quasi static criteria such as that of the
US Navy and British Royal Navy. Philosophy for the transformation of these deterministic in a set of rational criteria
with a stochastic approach or probabilistic criteria is based on
the Resolution A.265 (VIII) of the Design Data Sheet (DDS)
for passenger ships. Passenger ships, longer than the military
ships, still rely on deterministic criteria.
From the first of February of 1992 the probabilistic method
was inserted into SOLAS as Part B-1 of the Chapter II-1,

annex Regulation for subdivision and damage stability of
cargo ship over one hundred meters in length, that applies to
dry cargo ships constructed on or after the first of February of
1992. Later on, ships with length between eighty and one
hundred meters were also included.
The 8th Assembly of International Maritime Organization
(IMO), in the Resolution A.265 (VIII), adopted a set of probabilistic regulations of subdivisions, which increased the requirements for damage stability passenger ships according to
the Part B of Chapter II of the SOLAS 1960 for passenger
ships.
Finally in the 80th session of IMO, Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) the working group finalized a substantial revision of SOLAS CHII pt 1 A, B and B1 aiming at harmonized
damage stability requirements for all ship types except tankers,
performed by means of a common probabilistic methods. The
draft was adopted at the MSC 80 without further modification.
The revised Ch II-1 will apply to all new passengers vessel,
ro-ro (roll on-roll off) and cargo ships built on or after the first
of January of 2009 (Pérez and Riola, 2011a).
Probabilistic concepts address the probability of damage
occurring at any location throughout a ship and adopt a more
rational criterion of subdivision by considering the likelihood
of damage resulting in the flooding of only one compartment,
or any number of adjacent compartments, either longitudinally, transversely or vertically. The residual buoyancy and
stability of a ship is calculated for each such case of damage,
and either a positive or a zero contribution is associated to
each case, depending on, whether or not, the residual buoyancy and stability are considered sufficient.
In probabilistic terms, a ship does not need to survive in
every possible case of damage. The probabilistic criterion
provides that there are a number of survival cases which allow
obtaining a total value A (Attained Subdivision Index) equal
or greater than a reference R (Required Subdivision Index). In
the new SOLAS revision, in addition, the partial index As, Ap
and Al are not less than 0.9•R for passenger ships and 0.5•R
for cargo ships. For an easy understanding about the implication of the new R index, please see Table 3.
The A index attained by a ship considered to be measure its
level of safety against both sinking and capsizing. In this way,
two ships that have different main dimensions but whose A
indexes are equal, may be considered as having the same level
of safety. Three loading conditions need consideration:
A  0.4  As  0.4  Ap  0.2  Al

(1)
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where the index s, p and l represents the three loading conditions, and the factor that multiplies to the index indicates the
degree of the index A according with each loading condition.
It is worth mentioning the debate between deterministic or
probabilistic methods continues. In addition it must be emphasized that no Navy used stochastic methods or probabilistic as exhibited during the development of Naval Ship Code
(NSC) when the President of the International Association of
Classification Societies said that it would thus remain. Therefore, since the focus of this paper was on warships, mainly due
to the appearance on the scene of the new NSC which will be
mandatory for all military naval constructions this year and
leveraging the use of a Computer Aided Design (CAD) system,
the objective was the comparison of the various deterministic
criteria and whether the new NSC was really more or less
restrictive than the previous version and in which cases (Pérez
and Riola, 2011b).
Some of the factors that can improve the probabilistic criteria:
 Combination of water on deck with the probabilistic concept.
 To optimize compartment and ship design from the point of
its damage stability. KG (permissible height of the center of
gravity) calculation using a data base of real cases.
 Analysis by ship type.

III. NAVY CRITERIA
1. US Navy Criteria
The criteria used to evaluate adequate damage stability
performance according the Design Data Sheet (DDS) is based
on a reduction of the righting arm equal to 0.05•cos, and it
is included in the righting arm curve to account for unknown
unsymmetrical flooding or transverse shift of loose material.
Beam wind heeling arm curve is calculated with the same
method as used for intact stability calculations, but considering a beam wind velocity of around 33 (knots) as defined in
DDS. The damage stability is considered satisfactory if the
static equilibrium angle of heel c, point C without wind rolling effects does not exceed 15. The limit angle 1 of the
damage righting arm curve is 45 or the angle at which unrestricted flooding into the ship would occur, whichever is less
(Sarchin and Goldberg, 1962) and (Surko, 1994).
In Table 4 there is a comparison between the most important naval damage criteria, UK Naval criteria (called NES 109)
and US Naval criteria (named DDS-079).
The criterion is considered fulfilled if the reserve of dynamic stability A1 is not less than 1.4•A2, where A2 extends r
to windward. The tendency during recent decades in surface
naval ship design was to assess and minimize susceptibility
through detailed signature management. For the naval architect it is usually enough to assess the adequacy of its design
with respect to vulnerability through the use of the damaged
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Table 4. UK vs. US Navy damage stability criteria.
Criteria
Damage length

Permeability

Area A1

NES 109
DDS-079
LWL < 30 m
1 compartment
30 m < LWL < 92 m
2 comp of 6 m
92 m < LWL
15% LWL
Watertight Void
95%
Accommodation
95%
Machinery
85%-95%
Stores
60%-95%
> 1.4 Area A2

stability requirements introduced by the various navies, such
as those used by the US Navy and the UK Ministry of Defense
(MoD).
A damage incident for the purposes of this chapter is defined as a breach of watertight or watertight integrity. When
the watertight or watertight integrity of a ship is breached by
any mechanism the ship is at risk of loss due to flooding. The
extent of the breach and the ship’s initial loading condition and
material state will dictate the likelihood of the ship being lost.
Irrespective of whether the damage is caused by an accidental
or hostile event all damage can be categorized. The level of
safety and performance following damage will depend on the
severity of the damage incident.
2. Naval Ship Code
In addition to navies, Classification Societies through the
NSCA have a standing invitation to attend the meetings of the
specialist team as active participants. The specialist team is
tasked with the development of a NSC that will provide a costeffective framework for a naval surface ship safety management system based on and benchmarked against IMO conventions and resolutions. The Specialist Team has established
a Goal Based Approach to the development of the NSC and is
now developing each chapter in turn. This folder in the NAS
(Naval Authority System) library contains the latest documents including NSC chapters, related guidance and records
of meetings. The NSC adopts a goal based approach. The
basic principle of a goal based approach is that the goals
should represent the top tiers of the framework, against which
ship is verified both at design and construction stages, and
during ship operation. This enables the NSC to become prescriptive if appropriate for the subject, or remain at a high level
with reference to other standards and their assurance processes.
The goal based approach also permits innovation by allowing
alternative arrangements to be justified as complying with the
higher level requirements. The increasing width of the triangle as the NSC descends through the tiers implies an increasing level of detail (Riola and Pérez, 2009).
A catastrophic event, Fig. 1, caused by damage that the ship
and persons on board would not be expected to survive, will
result in rapid loss of the ship. Following an extreme event,
resulting from damage more severe than foreseeable but not
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Guidance: “Take remedial action”

Stability & buoyancy adequate

Green

Foreseeable
Guidance: “Take immediate remedial action
& consider evacuation”

Stability & buoyancy marginal

Amber

Extreme flood

Fig. 2. Solutions for the communication between tanks.

Catastrophic
Red

Loss of stability & buoyancy

Source: Guide to the Naval Ship Code.
Fig. 1. Severity of damage event for stability.

catastrophic, the ship would be expected to remain afloat in a
condition that will allow personnel to evacuate if required. In
the event of damage below the extreme level, foreseeable
damage, the ship would be expected to survive although the
level of real operational capability will depend on a particular
navy’s concept of operations. Chapter III is primarily concerned
with foreseeable operating conditions up to extreme damage,
with exception of the Regulation 6 preservation of life.

IV. WARSHIP CASE STUDY
1. Application
Nowadays, in both practical navigation and shipyard technical offices, stability tests in load and sea conditions, as in
working or damaged conditions, are performed with software
packages that starting from the ship design are able to quickly
compute the required data. This research focuses on evaluating the configuration of ships. The CAD used allows visualization of the detailed requirements generated from the stability requirement chosen, and also enables data entry to
compute minimum GM’s. Inside the modules, it is possible to
check the most common standard stability criteria and a user
can define criteria, obtaining if necessary, the limiting KG
values.
The two chosen ships, called first and second project, for
this analysis have a double bottom with a height upper to a
tenth of the beam. First project is similar to a warship and
second project is similar to a merchant ship.
Different configurations, as shown in the Fig. 2, have been
applied to both of them. To find the dimensions, a database
with merchants and warships of similar characteristics has
been used.
2. Results
Safety at sea has improved considerably in recent decades
thanks to the incorporation of new technologies to the ships

and the legislative effort made by the IMO, without forgetting
the work of ship inspections and Classification Societies ensuring that vessels are constructed and operated according to
existing regulations. The major maritime disasters have traditionally been coupled with the pressure of public opinion,
alarmed at the loss of life at sea. It has prompted the governments of the major maritime nations in a legislative effort
to improve the safety of ships. This is the first case of SOLAS,
held in London in 1914, two years after the sinking of the
RMS Titanic, though it was not actually due to the outbreak of
the World War I. It is not necessary to go back to early last
century to find new examples, the collapse and subsequent
overturning of the MV Estonia in 1994, in waters of the Baltic
Sea, was the driver, as discussed in chapter two of this article
of the Stockholm Agreement and a series of resolutions IMO
related to the stability of such vessels.
The IMO, as a United Nations agency, was founded in
Geneva in 1948, but did not start its activity until 1952, to
develop and maintain the regulatory framework for governing
the shipping, including aspects such as security or pollution,
taking into account the international conventions as SOLAS
or MARPOL, among others. It is organized into specialized
committees and subcommittees, consisting of experts from
member countries to study various aspects of maritime safety
and the updating of regulatory legislation. This is the case of
the MSC, which means all aspects that directly affect the sea,
such as construction and equipment or the training of crews.
In the naval field, there are no organizations equivalent to
the IMO to understand the international level of the safety of
such vessels. Traditionally, the warships are taking the existing
rules of IMO that do not interfere with naval objectives and
adapting them as far as possible. The intact stability calculations are made for checking if the warship complies with the
intact stability criteria and that if not fulfilled, the values were
obtained at the end of the study would be worthless.
Back to the study, depending on ship compartment and
flood conditions will get damage stability results. In Fig. 3
there is one of the damage conditions applied in the first test
ship. The flood damage can be considered by an opening in
the side, at the bottom or the failure of the deck to allow the
entry of water and lead to flooding of the ship. In this paper,
the damage occurs on one side, bottom up. The ships have
been damaged, compartment by compartment. When one
compartment is flooded, there is a loss of buoyancy, a change
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Table 5. Intact stability criteria.
CRITERIA
NUMBER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

DESCRIPTION
GZ of 0.2 (m) between 30 and 90
DN of 55.0 (mm•rd) between 0 and 30
DN of 90.0 (mm•rd) between 0 and 40
DN of 30.0 (mm•rd) between 30 and 40
GM > 0.150 (m)
Angle for which a maximum GZ is obtained > 25
IMO weather criterion

Fig. 3. Longitudinal section/first flood for first project.

of trim, a variation of a transverse metacentric height and
longitudinal metacentric height variation. Now the intention
is to study the GM’s minimum, or KG’s maximum for the
three criteria that we want to compare. To explore the stability
problems, it needs the help of software to carry out the calculations. In the case of this research to study the SOLAS, the
US Navy and the British Royal Navy criteria, the calculations
were made using a CAD, choosing a damage condition and a
load condition of the vessel intact, and are getting results that
are developed below. The worst damage is one where KG’s
maximum is the minimum among all possible failures, or put
another way, which has the stronger GM’s minimum for each
draft.
Where DN means dynamic stability and it is measured in
(mm•rd) and GZ is the righting arm in (m).
In order to realize a complete study, it is necessary to study
the intact stability. Some of the results are shown in Table 5,
Table 6 and Table 7. In these tables DP is displacement in tons,
GM is minimum permissible metacentric height in meters and
KG is permissible height of the center of gravity in meters.
3. IMO Applicability
SOLAS implies safety, but is by no means applicable to all
types of vessel. Mainly because many of its rules are unworkable or unrealistic for the warships.
Due to the need to unify criteria for the countries of the
NATO and the lack of a security policy that ensures minimal
compliance, a group of specialists was formed with the task of
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Table 6. Intact stability limit values for first project.
Draft (m)

DP (T)

Criteria

GZ (m)

GM (m)

3.65
4.43
5.37
6.21

4069.5
4801.9
6364.5
7488.1

7
7
7
7

12.43
13.03
13.30
13.40

3.64
2.23
1.19
0.68

Table 7. Intact stability limit values for second project.
Draft (m)

DP (T)

Criteria

GZ (m)

GM (m)

9.03
10.75
12.50
14.22

42511.5
50138.3
66453.2
78184.4

7
7
7
7

11.352
12.104
12.442
12.623

2.518
1.576
0.854
0.339

developing the NSC, a naval military code based on national
standards, international standards such as High Speed Craft,
high-speed vessels, and primarily, the applicable rules of the
SOLAS, to promote improvements in the design construction
and in specific areas such as navigation in international waters,
communications or environmental protection. SOLAS begins
by defining criteria on the extent of damage to consider. These
dimensions, based on statistics of failure, are defined as a fault
length equal to 3% of the length plus three meters, a penetration of damage equal to B/5 and a height of damage that goes
from bottom to top without limit. The worst damage in SOLAS,
considering water on deck, is composed of two compartments,
as it is shown in Tables 8 and 9.
There are certainly some obvious weaknesses in the requirements of the Agreement and this must be borne in mind
when assessing ro-ro safety. The Stockholm Agreement was
created on the presumption that a vessel designed, or modified,
to SOLAS’90 standards ensures survival at sea states with Hs
of only 1.5 (m). This was suggested in the face of uncertainty
and lack of understanding of the phenomena involved. The
evidence amassed so far and presented in the following suggests that this was a considerable underestimate. The maximum penalty of 0.5 (m) height of water on deck is ill based. It
is to be noted that the forty-nine tests used to measure water
accumulation on the car deck comprised only four open
decked ships, the others having car decks with: three transverse bulkheads, five central casing, nineteen central casing
with transverse bulkheads, eight side casings and ten side
casings with transverse bulkheads. It is straightforward to
prove that the height of water accumulated on a subdivided
deck is considerably larger than the height of water accumulated on open decks.
More importantly, requirements based on subdivided decks
are likely to promote designs with similar arrangements,
which is contrary to the ro-ro concept itself. Finally, the effect
of water on deck is taken into account by a calculation method
that does not preserve the physics of the problem, and being
based on static and deterministic approaches, it tends to negate
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Table 8. Worst damage along with IMO for first project.

Table 10. Worst damage along with DDS for first project.

MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION

MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION
Draft (m)
Displacement (T)
KGMAX (m)
GMMIN (m)

Draft (m)
3.65
4.43
5.37
6.21

Displacement (T)
4069.5
4801.9
6364.5
7488.1

KGMAX (m)
14.761
13.959
13.335
12.996

GMMIN (m)
1.301
1.048
0.889
0.791

Table 9. Worst damage along with IMO for second project.
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION
Displacement (T)
KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)

Draft (m)
9.03
10.75
12.50
14.22

42511.5
50138.3
66453.2
78184.4

13.345
12.776
12.322
11.986

2.435
2.002
1.567
1.231

Fig. 4. USS Nevada trapped in Pearl Harbor.

the potential for adopting rational approaches to safety through
the introduction of operational sea states and performancebased standards.
4. US Navy Applicability
The US Navy stability criteria are documented in the DDS,
which is divided into criteria for damage stability for both
sides´ protected and non-protected vessels. The non-protected
criteria relate to the 82.3 (m) cutter that is the class used in this
investigation. The DDS states that an angle of less than fifteen
degrees is required after damage for operational requirements.
There is no mention of cross-flood systems except for in the
side-protected vessels, which states that the maximum list
shall not exceed twenty degrees and that arrangements exist
for rapidly reducing the list to less than five degrees (US Navy,
1975). The current stability criteria used by the US Navy were
developed during and shortly after World War II. See the USS
Nevada in the Fig. 4.
These criteria are based on static righting arm curve, are
largely empirical, and do not explicitly consider many vari-

3.65
4.43
5.37
6.21

4069.5
4801.9
6364.5
7488.1

15.147
14.232
13.641
13.412

0.919
0.787
0.673
0.620

Table 11. Worst damage along with DDS for second project.
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION
Draft (m)
Displacement (T)
KGMAX (m)
GMMIN (m)
9.03
10.75
12.50
14.22

42511.5
50138.3
66453.2
78184.4

15.034
14.089
13.501
13.248

1.045
0.902
0.771
0.663

ables which can have a major impact on dynamic intact stability (US Navy criteria outputs in Table 10 and Table 11).
However, they are accepted by the experts, and within conventional hull forms, have proven to be a reliable, generally
conservative, ordinal measure of intact stability. Current international efforts for improving naval ships stability criteria
are focused on time domain analysis including the capability
to model a steered ship. Merchant ship intact stability is addressed in a number of IMO regulations.
The IMO weather criteria considers wind with gusts and
a roll-back angle which is dependent on the ship’s static
righting arm and other ship roll characteristics. The US Navy
and other navies have not kept pace with IMO developments.
They continue to rely on the empirical World War II criteria
until the more sophisticated methods are developed and validated. Validation and acceptance of these new methods may
take some time. Current naval ship can be greatly improved
with a few small changes which maintain the integrity of their
basic approach, and increase their commonality with the IMO
criteria. These changes are worth making now, to support the
design of new ships until more sophisticated methods are in
place. The worst damage is that which includes three compartments.
5. New Approach
The damage categories, in the NSC, are based on defined
shapes:
 Sphere. To be used for explosions. For explosions detonating against the outside of the hull, half the sphere to be
used.
 Cube. To be used to define the volume directly affected by
fire and which may change in shape to fit the compartment.
 Raking/grounding. To be used in the appropriate horizontal
orientation to describe the extent of raking or grounding
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Table 12. Worst damage along with NSC for first project.
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION
Draft (m)
Displacement (T)
KGMAX (m)
GMMIN (m)
3.65
4.43
5.37
6.21

4069.5
4801.9
6364.5
7488.1

15.034
14.089
13.501
13.248

1.045
0.902
0.771
0.663

Table 13. Worst damage along with NSC for second project.
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION
Draft (m)
Displacement (T)
KGMAX (m)
GMMIN (m)
9.03
42511.5
13.966
1.756
10.75
50138.3
13.338
1.444
12.50
66453.2
12.782
1.212
14.22
78184.4
12.342
0.996

damage, the apex representing the maximum penetration.
 Collision. To be used in the correct vertical orientation to
describe the extent of collision damage from the bow of
another ship, the apex representing the maximum penetration.
The extent of the worst damage category is defined as
damage category C, significant: sphere with 10 (m) of radius,
cube with 20 (m) of sides, raking/grounding with 40 (m) of
length and 5 (m) of equal sides and collision damage with 40
(m) of height and 5 (m) of equal sides. The temperature is heat
caused by initiating event assuming no other combustion.
Time to rise to peak of 20 (min), peak temperature 400 (C),
duration of peak temperature 400 (min) and time for temperature to revert to normal 200 (min).
After the study of the outputs, it is possible to declare that
the worst damage is the grounding, as it is shown in Tables 12
and 13. Proof that ships meets all known criteria, will not
tolerate a failure of forty meters in length in the double bottom.
Therefore, for comparison between criteria, it will not be used
the failure of raking/grounding, defined in the NSC. Of the
other three types of damage, and if comparable with the
SOLAS, the worst of all is the one defined by a cube of twenty
meters on the side. Such as the title of the work submitted for
this article it is important to note that a detailed study of the
navies criteria to use for the calculations, made by a CAD, the
criterion of NES-109. It is necessary in this case study the
damage defined as the NSC with a cube.

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a comparative analysis of
the different criteria of stability after damage. For this research the various studies and calculations have been carried
out on a designed test vessel. We have created a vessel to
comply with different conditions, like having an empty deck,

Fig. 5. Second project studied in a 3D visualization.

without pillars, one propeller shaft and whose forms are as
close as possible to a warship. See Fig. 5.
A most important conclusion to emphasize, that while the
approach of the British Royal Navy is more restrictive than the
US Navy, if we are considering the Stockholm Agreement to
SOLAS, is that this convention is the most restrictive of all. If
water is seen on deck, no military approach is more restrictive
than the IMO. It means that the navies never have considered
in their calculations water on deck. It is true that due to civil
ro-ro accidents, during the nineties, the IMO started considering the water on deck as dangerous and it was incorporated
an annex to the SOLAS, to take account this problem. Although the navies never have considered this kind of flood, it
seems that this problem has a critical value in the ship damage
stability analysis. In concrete, this damage should be investigated, if the ship has a low freeboard.
There are many areas where military vessels could improve
safety standards, although not necessarily to be regarded as
less secure than the civil vessels. However, there are major
difficulties in implementing all the rules of the Classification
Societies in the naval field; especially to establish a priority
mission and capacity combat against security. It is important
to distinguish the importance of the new rules NSC. The NSC
has become the criterion of stability in damage than more is
acclimating to the navies’ standards in the XXI century, as it
has been reflected throughout the paper. For each type of
vessel could be a priority for study in terms of damages of the
NSC. As the NSC is to provide a level of safety appropriate to
the role of the ship and benchmarked against statute while
taking into account naval operations, it is necessary to define
the degree of survivability in a form that can be taken into
account in the development and application of all NSC chapters. By way of example, the fundamental difference between
the approach to fire safety for naval and civilian shipping is
that SOLAS considers the risk of fire based on the function of
each compartment whereas for naval ships, hostile acts may
result in fire anywhere on the ship, both externally and internally. The consequence is that the solutions that are adopted
for accidents may differ from those that are required to prevent
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and counteract hostile damage events. Thus, for the effective
application of the NSC, it is necessary to clearly define the
extent of damage that reflects both accidental damage and
potential damage caused by hostile acts, the damage location,
the degree of vulnerability (protection, redundancy of systems,
materials used), the required post-damage ship capability and
the philosophy for recovery from the damaged state. Each
navy will have its own unique approach to this issue, and it is
not possible to be prescriptive in the NSC. However, it is
possible to provide a basic framework that can then be adapted
by each Naval Administration. It is then essential that the
owner and naval administration agree the required level of
survivability in these terms for each class of ship.
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